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Interest in the evolutionary theoretical implications of convergent evolution has
surged over the last decade, in part due to accessible monographs (such as Conway
Morris 2003) that have drawn attention to this important and under-investigated
evolutionary phenomenon. Just how ubiquitous is convergent evolution in the
history of life, and what does the frequency of convergence tell us about the
constraints on macroevolution as it has unfolded on Earth and as it might do in other
nooks and crannies of the habitable universe?
Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful is an exceedingly well-
researched, lucidly written, and wonderfully synthetic review of convergent
evolution research, making a strong case for the ubiquity of convergent evolution
at all levels of the biological hierarchy. McGhee has compiled an impressive
evidence base to be mined by future researchers, and the book is brimming with
fascinating and underappreciated examples, some of which are of great evolutionary
significance. Unlike existing monographs on the topic, Convergent Evolution is
illustrated with clear, accessible figures and makes extensive use of cladograms that
underscore the phylogenetic distance bridged by convergent events. It is now
arguably the definitive empirical source for any biologist or non-specialist interested
in the phenomenon of convergent evolution. However, like similar works before it,
McGhee’s exposition is somewhat less effective on the theoretical and philosophical
fronts. Before canvassing our major criticisms of the book, we will provide a brief
summary of each chapter.
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In the first chapter, McGhee introduces the phenomenon of convergent evolution
and offers a terse treatment of definitional problems surrounding the concept of
homoplasy. This crucial introductory chapter contains far less conceptual and
methodological meat than one might expect of a work in theoretical biology. For
instance, it fails to even gesture at problems confronting modern cladistics and
phylogenetic inference, the contested nature of the homology concept, and
philosophical debates over how we might distinguish between different types of
convergent evolution. Like Conway Morris before him, McGhee treats parallel
evolution, both in this chapter and throughout the book, as ‘‘simply a type of
convergent evolution’’ (p. 7), without considering its deeper theoretical significance.
On McGhee’s proffered definition, ‘‘parallelism’’ refers to homoplasy that is
produced from the same ancestral character or through cooptation of the same
genetic-developmental resources, such as deep homologs. There are a host of
empirical, methodological and conceptual problems that confront attempts to
delineate parallelism in these ways, which McGhee fails to consider; these range
from conceptions of sameness, to the level-relative nature of homology judgments,
to the lack of total homology in the gene networks that are developmentally
responsible for parallelism in closely related groups (for discussions of these and
other problems, see e.g., Currie 2013; Pearce 2012; Powell 2012; Ramsey and
Peterson 2012; Arendt and Reznick 2007). Furthermore, by characterizing both
parallel and convergent events as independently derived outcomes, McGhee glosses
over the theoretical importance of this distinction and its implications for our
understanding of constraints on the shape of complex multicellular life (more on this
below).
Chapter 2 is a tour de force of convergent evolution in animals, including (inter
alia) swimming, flying, walking, burrowing and other locomotory morphologies,
sensory modalities, teeth, beaks and claws, poison injection systems, digestive
capabilities, defensive structures, reproductive strategies, and so on. This is easily
the strongest chapter in the book, making a powerful case for the ubiquity and
importance of convergence in animal evolution. Importantly, here and throughout
the book, McGhee also considers intriguing instances of non-convergence, such as
the lack of snake-like morphologies in mammals and the absence of mole-like
excavator morphologies in reptiles. The chapter also takes developmental
constraints seriously (though not seriously enough—see discussion below),
explaining why ‘centaur-like’ forms (possessing four legs and two arms) cannot
evolve within the confines of the four-limbed vertebrate body plan, but have
evolved, repeatedly, in insects (namely, with respect to iterated ‘mantis’ forms). In
contrast, McGhee shows that external physical constraints may explain why, for
example, no predator has ever evolved eyes that can resolve the infrared range of the
electromagnetic spectrum despite the obvious fitness advantages such an adaptation
would confer.
Chapter 3 reviews convergences within the plant clade. Featuring the exceptional
work of the biologist Karl Niklas and others, McGhee argues that convergence
along multiple parameters on tree and leaf morphologies, water transport and root
systems, and other structures has occurred repeatedly due to functional constraints
imposed by the physical laws. McGhee argues, convincingly, that in both animals
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and plants, convergent reproductive strategies dwarf quintessential cases of
morphological convergence—as is the case, for example, with viviparity in
animals, and heterospory, seed and seed-dispersal systems in plants. It is important
to note that many of the key convergences in plants hinge on the existence of animal
pollinators and animal seed dispersal mechanisms. Plant-animal coevolutionary
interaction appears to add layers of contingency to the evolution of certain iterated
plant morphologies, as well as to the evolution of particular ecotypes (discussed in
the next chapter), which the author fails to consider.
Chapter 4 sets out in search of a ‘‘periodic table of niches,’’ focusing on the
iterated evolution of ecotypes (such as insectivore, nectarivore, carnivore,
omnivore, herbivore, chase predator, ambush predator, etc.), and ecomorphs (such
as ‘vulture’, ‘lion’, ‘ungulate’ and ‘mole’). McGhee takes convergence in
ecomorphology, such as the strikingly similar faunas that evolved in parallel
between marsupial and placental mammals, as evidence that ‘‘these [specialized]
ecological roles exist in the absence of either placental or marsupial mammals and,
since the placentals were not present in Australia, the marsupials independently
discovered them in their own separate evolution’’ (p. 160). This conclusion is
problematic because it fails to consider how contingent mammalian (and more
broadly tetrapodian) body plans constrain and underwrite iterated ecological
evolution. The discussion of pre-existing niches would also have benefited from
connecting up with the wider theoretical literature on organism-niche codetermi-
nation, in particular with Richard Lewontin’s well-known critique of so-called
‘lock-and-key’ models of ecological evolution. These quibbles aside, perhaps the
most significant problem with this chapter—one that is symptomatic of an
overarching impediment to the convergence project—is that it lumps plausible
candidates for universal niches (such as broadly defined ecotypes) together with
arguably more contingent iterated outcomes, such as ecomorphs that hinge on the
tetrapodian body plan. For instance, the generalization ‘‘there will never evolve a
sessile herbivore for sessile plants’’ seems to be far stronger (i.e., more widely
applicable) than the claim ‘‘there will evolve a lion ecomorph,’’ due to the sheer
number contingencies that arguably underlie the evolution of mammalian and more
broadly tetrapodian developmental architecture. We discuss this lumping problem
in greater detail below.
Chapter 5 offers a preliminary examination of convergent evolution at the lowest
scales in the biological hierarchy, from nucleic and amino acids to proteins. Among
the most intriguing examples are the convergent evolutions of identical nucleotide
substitutions producing similar sensitivities to light, of antifreeze protein molecules
in cold-water fishes, and of enzymes that catalyze the first step in sugar metabolism.
Homoplasy research is typically focused on the macromorphology of animals and
plants, and thus McGhee’s attention to convergence at the microscopic scale is
much welcome. Nevertheless, his overarching analysis of convergence remains
macromorphocentric, considering only a handful of examples of convergence in
prokaryotes and never even mentioning archea. Thus, convergent evolution among
single-celled organisms remains an important and under-investigated area that is
ripe for future research.
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Chapter 6 is, in our opinion, the weakest chapter in the book. It is sold as a review
of convergent minds when in actuality it details convergence in behaviors.
Prominent examples in the chapter include the ‘‘farming phenotype’’ arrived at by
both ants (first) and humans (more recently), and ‘‘tool use’’ across vertebrate and
even in some insect groups. These behavioral traits are clearly not underpinned by
similar mental/cognitive mechanisms in the groups that have converged on them. It
is well established in ethology that similar behaviors can be produced by
fundamentally different mental activities and cognitive processes, a point
overlooked by McGhee when he argues ‘‘animals with radically different brains
have evolved the same architectural behaviors. Those analogous behaviors thus
reflect analogous mental activities and cognitive strategies taking place in
independent lineages, which is convergent mental evolution’’ (p. 221). McGhee
thus makes the fallacious leap from ‘‘same behavior’’ to ‘‘same underlying mental/
cognitive processes.’’ Yet few would be sympathetic, for example, to McGhee’s
claim (p. 227) that the ‘‘agricultural minds’’ of ants and humans are the subject of
cognitive convergence. The same is true for the mental mechanisms underlying
herding behavior and pack hunting among various vertebrate clades. Nor is it clear
that the loosely analogous phenotypes referred to in this chapter, such as ‘‘farming’’,
‘‘tool use’’, and ‘‘architectural behavior,’’ are genuine natural kinds or even
sufficiently similar traits to be properly classified as cases of convergence (though
the impressive suite of independently derived agricultural features may suggest that
this trait can be satisfactorily delineated). Although there is some discussion of
convergent metacognition—among the few genuinely ‘mental’ elements of the
chapter—McGhee curiously omits recent work on cephalopod cognition, which is
without question the most robust example of sophisticated cognitive convergence
that we know of, given that mollusks and vertebrates share an essentially brainless
common ancestor in the base of the Cambrian.
It is not until Chapter 7 that the heavy philosophical lifting begins. Here, McGhee
provides a theoretical framework and a series of useful figures for conceiving of the
realm of the biologically possible, and for illustrating the interaction between
internal (developmental) and external (functional) constraints that shape morpho-
space occupation (see Fig. 1). This chapter would have benefited, however, from
closer contact with the astrobiological literature on possible life (c.f. Schulze-
Makuch and Irwin 2012), as well as the philosophical literature on constraints in
biology (c.f. Amundson 1994; Sansom 2003).
We finally come to the ‘philosophical’ implications of convergent evolution in
the eponymous final chapter of the book. Disappointingly, it fails to wade into any
major conceptual or methodological problems in the philosophy of biology that
pertain to the present project. Instead, it proceeds to consider the implications of the
radical evolutionary contingency thesis (and its antithesis) for our ability to find
meaning in the universe and for the plausibility of theism. Frustratingly, McGhee
presents a buffet of views on these matters without ever taking a clear stand or
adjudicating their respective plausibilities. He does, however, in concluding the
book, inveigh against what we believe to be an uncharitable caricature of the
opposing Gouldian view of life, which we discuss in more detail below.
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This brings us to overarching concerns with the book. Convergent Evolution’s
greatest asset—its massive inventory of exemplar convergent events in the history
of life—is also its greatest flaw. Like other recent attempts to establish the empirical
and theoretical importance of homoplasy, McGhee’s monograph is guilty of
‘lumping’ disparate convergent phenomenon into a single basket and proclaiming
the ubiquity of the phenomenon. In effect, it treats all instances of homoplasy as if
they are of comparable theoretical import, nomic necessity, and counterfactual
robustness. Yet some proffered examples of convergence are the basis of far
stronger generalizations than others, and McGhee offers no principled way of
determining the relative significance of convergent outcomes. For instance, he lists
nine examples of plants that have evolved vessels to transport water, and over twice
as many examples of convergence in flowers that facilitate beetle pollination—but
surely we would expect vessels to evolve earlier, more frequently, and more
consistently in any given evolutionary system than features that are contingent on
beetle pollination. In this respect at least, the whole is less than the sum of its parts,
permitting uncharitable opponents to seize on the weakest cases in arguing against
the law-like implications of convergence. In our own future work on this topic, we
aim to develop a typology of convergence that breaks down the heterogeneous
reference class of convergent events in accordance with the robustness of the
generalizations they can plausibly support. McGhee’s review will no doubt serve as
a critical empirical resource for this conceptual project.
A second major problem with the book is that it fails to seriously engage with,
and systematically mischaracterizes, Stephen Jay Gould’s (1989) ‘‘radical contin-
gency thesis.’’ Gould’s controversial, thought-provoking thesis is arguably the
major motivation for recent work on convergent evolution, and yet it is not
introduced until the very end of the book and then only briefly discussed (p. 266).
And even there, it is considered only in relation to finding meaning in the universe.
Like others before him, McGhee touts the ubiquity of convergent evolution as a
rebuke of Gould’s claim that the overarching shape of life is deeply historically
contingent. The problem, however, is that McGhee’s analysis never actually comes
into contact with the core claims of Gould’s thesis. It would have been helpful if
McGhee had used the diagram from chapter 7 to contrast his view of life with that of
Fig. 1 Adapted from
Figure 7.4 (p. 249). f:0 is the set
of biological forms that are non-
functional and cannot be
developed by life on Earth. f:1 is
the set of biological forms that
are functional and can be
developed by life on Earth. f:2 is
the set of biological forms that
are nonfunctional but could be
developed by life on Earth.
Finally, f:3 is the set of
biological forms that are
functional but cannot be
developed by life on Earth
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Gould, perhaps by drawing smaller boundaries around the space of forms that are
functional, developmentally possible, and actual (see Fig. 2). Instead, McGhee
refutes a series of claims that Gould did not hold, and with which Gould would be
unlikely to disagree.
For instance, McGhee arrives at the following two main conclusions (p. 271).
‘‘First, the view that the evolutionary process is nonrepeating (nonergotic) is
demonstrably false.’’ Nobody, and certainly not Gould, would hold such a blatantly
false view, and thus McGhee dismantles a straw man in a way that obscures the
genuine debate—which is really about the extent to which internal developmental
constraints (including the broad parameters of animal body plans) are responsible
for much or even most of the morphological reiteration. Contrary to McGhee, there
is room within the Gouldian view of life, with its emphasis on internally constrained
parallelism, for a great deal of reiteration and predictability (for a discussion, see
Powell 2012). Second, the view that evolution is entirely historically contingent,
and thus unpredictable (and nonrepeating), is demonstrably false.’’ Let us set aside
the problematic slide between epistemic issues (e.g., predictability) and metaphys-
ical ones (e.g., the robustness of macroevolutionary pattern across changes in initial
conditions). The trouble with this second conclusion is that once again, it is
addressed to a straw man. Occasional rhetorical flourish aside, neither Gould nor
any other contingency theorist could possibly hold that all of evolution is
historically contingent. The convergence/contingency debate is clearly a relative
significance dispute, and it should be characterized as such.
In addition, we must be clear about two things here. The first relates to the way in
which the concept of repeatability is being used in these disputes. Precisely what
degree of repeatability are we contemplating? McGhee is right that convergent
evolution is often indicative of functional constraint. But the key point of contention
between convergence proponents and contingency proponents is whether functional
constraints transcend the entrenched development of any particular lineage. Some
instances of convergence, especially interphyletic and interkingdom convergence,
do seem to contradict the Gouldian narrative, while other instances of homoplasy do
not (and could even be seen to bolster the Gouldian view). What we need to
develop, therefore, is a systematic way of distinguishing between these sorts of
Fig. 2 In this modified version
of Fig. 1, f:4 is introduced to
represent Stephen J. Gould’s
radical contingency thesis,
which holds that the actualized
set of biological forms are but a
small fraction of the set of
functional, Earth-possible
morphologies
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cases. Second, we must be clear about the explanandum. If we are asking whether
there is a high probability that teeth or the fusiform shape or the cambered wing foil
would evolve in any given replay of complex multicellular life, then perhaps the
amassed evidence of convergence points to an affirmative answer. If we are asking,
instead, whether there is a high probability that dolphinoids would evolve in any
given replay of complex multicellular life, then the amassed data on convergence is
far weaker. Since we only see dolphinoid convergence within the vertebrate body
plan, this tells us little about the robustness of such outcomes across the whole of
complex multicellular life on Earth or as it might evolve on Earth-like worlds. So
Gould’s claims about the contingent survival and developmental entrenchment of a
‘fortunate’ subset of actual (and possible) Cambrian body plans are never directly
addressed in the book.
A final regrettable aspect of the book is that it fails to connect up with virtually
any literature in the philosophy of science, including a sophisticated body of work
on biological laws, homology, phylogenetic inference, constraint, evolutionary
progress, niche construction, fine-tuning arguments, and so on, all of which would
have enriched the theoretical discussion.
In sum, Convergent Evolution is a seminal piece of synthetic empirical work that
belongs on every biologist’s shelf. It falls short, however, when it comes to
addressing important philosophical dimensions of the convergent evolution debate.
It is only by developing concepts and methods for carving up the vast set of iterated
evolutionary events that McGhee and others have admirably compiled that we will
understand the full bio-philosophical implications of convergent evolution.
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